Mutual funds' performance rankings are widely publicized in the media and have a strong impact on fund flows (see, e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998) . In this paper, we study risk taking incentives of mutual fund managers who have ranking objectives (as in a tournament). First, in a two-period model, we analyze the game played by two risk-neutral fund managers with ranking objectives. We show that in the first period, managers choose the same risk level but do not act in the interest of investors. In the second period the interim loser (i) takes more risk than the interim winner and (ii) the level of risk undertaken by the interim loser is increasing with the difference in interim performances. Second, we empirically test some predictions of the model in a sample of US diversified equity funds in 1980-1998, using a more powerful methodology than in previous studies and accounting for cross-correlation in fund returns. We find evidence that fund choice of systematic risk in the last quarter of the year is negatively related to the performance over the first three quarters of the year, which is consistent with the model.
Introduction
When choosing between mutual funds, investors take into account many considerations such as fund performance, reputation, fee structure, the diversity and size of the fund's family, etc. (see, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1997, and Sirri and Tufano, 1998) . Naturally, a rational investor will select a fund, which offers the best combination of the relevant factors. Since fund performance seems to be the most important selection criterion for consumers (see Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince, 1996) , they typically choose funds that have high raw or risk-adjusted performance relative to their peer group (see, e.g., Ippolito, 1992 , Chevalier and Ellison, 1997 , Lettau, 1997 , and Sirri and Tuffano, 1998 . The information about fund performance rankings is regularly published in the financial media (the Wallstreet Journal, Business Week, Money, etc.) and is often referred to in funds' advertisements. The importance of rankings in describing fund performance is illustrated by Gould (1998) :
"Bartlett Europe has returned an annual average of 27.2 percent for the three years through Dec. 4, ranking first among the 46 European stock funds tracked by Morningstar Inc."
The academic literature also points out the importance of fund performance rankings for investors, documenting that rankings may have higher impact on fund flows than returns (see, e.g., Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks, 1994 , Massa, 1997 , and Goriaev, 2002 . Such investors' behavior induces ranking-based objectives for fund managers, since their compensation is typically based on a percentage of the fund's assets (see Khorana, 1996) .
The goal of this paper is to investigate how ranking objectives influence managers' investment strategies, and test empirically some predictions of the model. In the first part of the paper, we develop a model in which, during two investment periods, two risk-neutral managers compete for future money flows and observe their interim relative performance. We show that in the first period, managers choose the same risk level but do not maximize their expected return. In the second period, the interim loser (i) increases risk with respect to the first period while the interim winner decreases risk, (ii) the difference in risk undertaken is increasing with the difference in interim performances and (iii) the interim loser may act more in the interest of investors (i.e., choose a strategy with a higher expected return) than the interim winner. 1 In the second part of the paper, we apply a new methodology to empirically test some predictions of the model in a sample of US diversified equity funds in 1980-1998. We find evidence that fund choice of systematic risk in the last quarter of the year is negatively related to the category-relative performance over the first three quarters of the year, which is consistent with the model. In contrast to the previous studies (see, e.g., Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996, and Koski and Pontiff, 1999) , our statistical tests take into account the presence of the cross-correlation in fund returns highlighted by Busse (2001) .
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature, Section 3 presents the model, Section 4 derives the equilibrium, Section 5 considers the case with several competing funds, Section 6 presents the empirical results, and Section 7 concludes.
Related literature
A growing body of literature studies the mutual fund tournament both theoretically and empirically. Closely related theoretical papers studying relative performance evaluation in financial markets are those of Huddart (1999) , Hvide (1999) , Palomino (2002) , and Taylor (2000) . In this type of the models, a manager's payoff depends not only on his own strategy, but also on the other managers' strategies. In this respect, these models and our model are different from those analyzing the behavior of a manager evaluated against an exogenous benchmark (see, e.g., Grinblatt and Titman, 1989 , Admati and Pfleiderer, 1996 , Carpenter, 2000 . Hvide (1999) and Palomino (2002) study the consequences of relative performance objective in the context of a single investment decision. Hvide shows that in a situation with moral hazard on both effort and risk, standard tournament rewards induce excessive risk and lack of effort. Palomino (2002) assumes that managers with different levels of information compete in oligopolistic markets and aim at maximizing their relative performance against the average performance in their category. He shows that despite the objective function being linear in performances, managers have incentives to choose overly-risky strategies. Furthermore, relative performance objectives always lead to under-acquisition of information. Huddart (1999) considers a two-period model in which interim performances are observable. He shows that asset-based compensation schemes generate incentives for managers to invest in overly-risky portfolio in the first period, and that performance fees align managers' incentives with those of investors.
Our theoretical results should be compared with those of Cabral (1997) on the choice of R&D projects. Cabral considers an infinite-period race between two firms that choose between low variance projects (low gains with high probability) and high variance projects (large gains with low probability). If the two firms choose a project of the same type then outcomes are perfectly correlated. Cabral shows that in equilibrium, both firms choose overly risky R&D strategies. There are three main differences between Cabral's model and ours. First, in Cabral's model, players have an infinite horizon. It follows that strategy choices are not influenced by an "end of the game" effect. Second, players receive a payoff in every period. This is equivalent to assuming observable interim performance. Conversely, in our model, players face an end of the game and only receive a payoff at the end of the game. Finally, in Cabral's R&D race, projects' payoffs are different only in case of success. If projects fail, the costs faced by firms are independent of the projects chosen. This implies that an intermediate loser only catches up with the leader if a good outcome is realized. The situation is different in the mutual fund tournament. An intermediate loser has two ways of catching up with the winner: by winning more in case of good outcomes or by losing less is case of bad outcomes.
The consequences of dynamic incentives and relative performance evaluation have also been studied by Meyer and Vickers (1997) . They show that in a dynamic principal-agent relationship, relative performance evaluation can be either welfare increasing or decreasing. The reason is that in a dynamic setting, there may be both explicit and implicit incentives and better information may decrease implicit incentives. Our model is different from that of Meyer and Vickers in two ways. First, in their model, intermediate performance is observable. Second, in our model, portfolio decisions are costless, i.e., they do not require any effort from fund managers. This is different from standard principal-agent models in which agents' output results from an costly effort.
Another strand of the literature conducts empirical analysis of fund managers' strategic behavior, focusing on the impact of past performance on funds' risk taking decisions. Several studies test the so-called tournament hypothesis that funds underperforming after the first part of the year increase risk in the second part of the year, trying to catch up with interim winners at the end of the year. Applying a contingency table methodology to the sample of US growth funds in 1976 -1991 , Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996 find that interim losers (defined as funds below the median category return over the first part of the year) increase risk towards the end of the year relative to interim winners. Using a sample of US domestic equity funds in 1992-1994, Koski and Pontiff (1999) apply regression methodology and find a negative relationship between fund return over the first semester and the change in total, systematic, and unsystematic risk between the first and second semesters. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) use a different approach, measuring fund risk on the basis of the fund's portfolio holdings. They also find a negative relationship between fund return over the first nine months of the year and the change in fund risk between September and December, using a sample of growth and growth-and-income funds in 1982 -1992 . However, Busse (2001 argues that these results should be taken with caution. He finds no evidence in favor of the tournament hypothesis, applying either the contingency table or the regression methodology to daily returns of US domestic equity funds in 1985-1995. He explains this divergence in the results by the presence of the auto-and cross-correlation in fund returns, which was not accounted for in the standard statistical tests used in the previous studies.
Presentation of the model
There are two periods, 1 and 2, and two risk-neutral money managers. At the beginning of the first period, each manager has A ≥ 0 units of money under management. At the beginning of each period, managers choose an investment strategy. There is a continuum of investment strategies and the return of each strategy is log-normally distributed. The log-return of a strategy is normally distributed with variance v and mean m(v). Following Palomino and Prat (2002) , we assume that the function m(·) is positive, twice differentiable, strictly concave with m 000 (·) ≥ 0, and has a maximum atm = m(v) withv strictly positive.
A possible interpretation for the shape of m(·) is that there is no borrowing constraint but borrowing is increasingly costly. Therefore, there is a borrowing threshold beyond which the marginal borrowing cost exceeds the marginal expected return of investment.
Information about realized returns. After returns are realized at the end of period 1, managers observe both their performance and the performance of their opponent.
Managers' objective: Managers aim at maximizing the size of the funds under management at the end of period 2. The fund size can be increased in two ways. First, by realizing a high cumulated return over the periods 1 and 2, and second by attracting new funds.
There is a continuum of identical atomistic individual investors. On aggregate, these investors will have an amount of money B > 0 to invest at the end of period 2. Following empirical evidence provided by Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks (1994) and Massa (1997) , we assume that investors put their money in the fund that has realized the higher cumulative return over periods 1 and 2. If funds perform equally well, each fund will get an amount B/2.
Under such an assumption, the objective of manager i is to maximize
with j 6 = i, and where R i,t represents the gross return realized by manager i in period t. Our model captures the following idea in a simple framework. First, investors use rankings as a rule of thumb to evaluate managers and allocate capital to funds (as empirical evidence provided by Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks (1994) and Massa (1997) suggests).
Second, fund managers are risk-neutral agents who maximize the size of the fund they manage.
Before proceeding, several remarks should be made. First, we do not question whether fund investors are right or wrong to use rankings as a rule of thumb to evaluate fund managers. Rather, we study the consequences of this observed behavior.
Second, following Das and Sundaram (2002) and Palomino and Uhlig (2002) , we depart from the traditional principal-agent approach to contracting in which the principal (i.e., the investor) decides the compensation contract of the agent (i.e., the fund manager). In the mutual fund industry, funds (i.e., agents) choose the type of fee they charge to investors (principals). In our model, the compensation scheme (i.e., an asset-based compensation) is given. However, analyzing a game in which compensation contracts are endogenous, Palomino and Uhlig (2002) derive conditions under which asset-based contracts are chosen by mutual fund managers in equilibrium.
Third, it is assumed that portfolios are unobservable. We believe that this assumption is realistic, since portfolio disclosures are not frequent 2 and managers window-dress their portfolio around disclosure dates in practice (see, e.g., Musto, 1999, and Carhart et al., 2002) .
Also, we assume that returns realized by managers are uncorrelated. This implies that the only strategic decision of the managers is the variance of their portfolio. A more complete model would assume that a manager can also influence the covariance of returns. Such a case is considered in Appendix B and it is shown that, qualitatively, the results about risk taking incentives generated by ranking objectives derived in the case of uncorrelated returns still hold in the case of correlated returns.
Finally, it can be argued that investors evaluate managers with respect to each other only if the two managers are of different qualities. This may not be the case. It is sufficient that investors believe that managers are of different qualities. For example, consider the following situation. With probability 1/2, manager i is a high quality manager and with probability 1/2 he is a bad quality manager, and probabilities of being a good manager are independent across managers. Moreover, the two managers observe the realized types while investors do not. In such a situation, with probability 1/2, it is common knowledge among managers that they are of the same type. However, investors do not know whether managers are of the same type. According to investors' beliefs, with probability 1/2, there is a good and a bad manager, and they uses a relative performance rule to evaluate managers.
Here, in order to concentrate on incentives generated by differences in intermediate performances, we solely study the case in which managers are of the same quality. If managers were of different qualities, incentives in period 2 would be driven by both interim performances and difference in quality. The benchmark case. We consider as a benchmark the case in which managers maximize their expected return. In such a situation, in each period, the expected return of a manager is m(v) + v/2. Hence, both managers choose a risk level v =v such that m 0 (v) = − 1 2 . The goal of our model is to show how ranking objectives alter the managers' investment strategies.
Equilibrium investment strategies
We solve the model using backward induction. Hence, we start by deriving the equilibrium of the game played by the two managers in period 2. Denote R t,w and R t,l the gross return obtained in period by t by the interim winner and loser, respectively. Let r j,t = log(R j,t ) (j = l, w and t = 1, 2) and δ = r w,2 − r l,2 . From the assumption about the distribution of returns, r l,2 − r w,2 is normally distributed with mean m(v l ) − m(v w ) and variance v l + v w . Hence, the objective of the interim loser is to maximize
over v l , while the objective of the interim winner is to maximize
over v w , where Φ is cdf of the standard normal distribution. A manager's objective is to maximize the size of his fund at the end of the second period. This can be achieved in two ways. First, by obtaining a high return. This is captured by the first term in the right-hand sides of (2) and (3). This provides managers with incentives to maximize their expected return (i.e., choose v =v). The second way of increasing the size of the fund is by outperforming the opponent. This is captured by the second term in the right-hand sides of (2) and (3). The larger the ratio A/B, the more managers' incentives are aligned with investors' interests (i.e., the maximization of expected returns). Conversely, when the ratio A/B is small, managers' main objective is to outperform their opponent in order to receive B. To isolate incentives generated by tournament objectives, we concentrate on the case in which A is negligible with respect to B. (Technically, we assume that A = 0.) In such a situation, managers' only objective is to be ranked first. We have the following results.
Proposition 1 Assume that managers' objective function is given by (1) with A = 0. (i) If δ 6 = 0, then in the second period, the unique equilibrium is such that v * w <v < v * l with |m 0 (v * w )| = |m 0 (v * l )|. Furthermore, v * l and v * w are increasing and decreasing in δ, respectively.
(ii) If δ = 0, then there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in the second period: both managers choosev.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 states that if the two funds have performed differently in the first period (δ 6 = 0), then, in the last period, the unique equilibrium is such that an interim loser takes more risk than an interim winner. Furthermore, the larger the difference in performance between the interim winner and the interim loser at the end of period 1, the larger the difference in risk undertaken in period 2. If managers have performed equally well in the first period (δ = 0), they both choose a conservative strategy (v) in the first period. The reason for this last result is that if manager i choosesv and manager j 6 = i does not, then manager i has a probability of winning the contest strictly larger than 1/2, while if manager j choosesv, both managers have a probability 1/2 of winning the contest. Conversely,v is never a best reply tov, the reason being that the distribution of returns is not symmetric around its mean.
By the same argument, we derive equilibrium strategies played in the first period.
Proposition 2 Assume that managers' objective function is given by (1) with A = 0.
There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in the first period: both managers choosev.
Proof: See Appendix A. Proposition 2 implies that in the first period managers do not act in the interest of investors. As already mentioned, the reason is that the log-normal distribution is not symmetric with respect to its mean. It follows that if one manager chooses v =v, then the best reply of his opponent is notv.
From Propositions 1 and 2, we deduce that when compensation is exclusively based on ranking, an interim winner locks in his gain in the second period, hence decreasing his level of risk undertaken with respect to the first period. Conversely, the interim loser increases risk with respect to the first period. Note, however, that if δ is small, we have v * w <v < v * l <v. This implies that in the second period the interim loser acts more in the interest of investors than interim winners.
More than two competing funds
So far, we have assumed that there are only two competing funds. In this section, we consider a more realistic case in which there are more than two competing funds. Denote N > 2 the number of competing funds and assume that fund i receives the investors' money if it has the highest return over two periods:
The objective of fund i in period 2 is to maximize
If fund returns are uncorrelated, this is equivalent to maximizing
Given that log-returns are normally distributed, the first-order condition of the maximization program of manager
To derive some analytical results is quite a difficult task. Therefore, we rely on numerical simulations to provide evidence that the results of Proposition 1 hold in the case with more than two competing funds. In our basic simulations, we assume that m(v) = 1 − (1 − v) 2 and N = 3. In such a casev = 1 andv = 5/4. We denote v w , v s and v l the risk levels undertaken in the second period by the funds ranked first, second and third at the end of the first period, respectively. We obtain the following results for 100 observations 3 . For each observation, we have v w < v s < v l , v w <v and v l >v. This means that (i) the risk level chosen in the second period is negatively correlated with the interim performance and (ii) the interim winner (w) always decreased his risk level in the second period, while the interim loser (l) always increased his risk level. The fund ranked second either increased or decreased its risk level depending on the performance of the two other funds. Aggregate results from the simulations are given in the following We observe that, on average, the fund ranked second increased its risk level in the second period.
A final observation is that, on average, the interim loser acts more in the interest of investors that other funds. Its average risk level in the second period (1.39) is the closest to the risk level maximizing expected return (1.25). This confirms the remarks made about the results of Proposition 1 that the interim loser may act more in the interest of investors than the interim winner.
6 Empirical evidence
Data
We use mutual fund data from Morningstar's April 1999 Principia Pro Data Disk. The data set contains historical monthly returns, inception date, and various fund characteristics (e.g., fund sizes, expense ratios, minimum investment requirements, etc.). In our analysis, we use a sample of 3096 US diversified equity funds (excluding funds closed to the public), which were active in April 1999. These funds belong to one of five stated objective categories: aggressive growth, growth, growth-and-income, equity-income, and small company. The sample period is from January 1980 to December 1998.
It should be noted that our data set is survivorship biased, excluding funds that disappeared before 1999. As noted by Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) , if the probability of disappearance is higher for underperforming funds (see, e.g., Brown and Goetzmann, 1993) , this bias would be against finding a negative relationship between fund performance and risk, which our model predicts. In addition, our results will be shown to be qualitatively similar in the last years covered in our data set, when the survivorship bias is minimal. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the overall sample as well as objective categories in 1980-1998. During the sample period, an average diversified equity fund realized an annual return of 17.5%, which had standard deviation of about 16% per year. In line with our expectations, aggressive growth and small company funds had the highest total risk, approximately 21% and 19% per year, respectively. However, the highest return was achieved by less risky growth and growth-and-income funds. In all categories, funds, on average, underperformed, according to a one-factor model with the market factor. Jensen's alpha ranges from -0.14% to -0.58% per year for equity-income and small company funds, respectively. Based on the data from the beginning of 1999, an average fund had a six-year performance record and controlled about $610 million in assets.
To illustrate the difference between interim and end-of-the-year rankings, Table 2 reports the nine-month return rankings of funds that had top performance over the calendar year.
As expected, funds highly ranked after the first three quarters of the year are most likely to top the annual rankings. For example, in the growth category, the top interim performer became the winner of the annual tournament in eleven years out of nineteen. However, sometimes funds ranked as low as 79 out of 191 or 15 out of 19 topped the annual rankings. Thus, the contest for the top annual ranking is not limited to a few funds with best yearto-date performance, and even funds ranked relatively low at the interim stage still have a chance to win the annual tournament.
Tested hypothesis
Assume that manager i has an objective function given in (4), i.e., he receives a bonus if fund i's two-period return is the highest among N funds in the category. In this case, given the information about the first-period fund performance (denoted Info 1 , hereafter), the objective of manager i is to choose the amount of risk in the second period so as to maximize
where R i,t is fund i's return in period t. The higher fund i's interim relative performance, the higher the probability of fund i outperforming the other funds at the end of the second period and receiving the bonus. In case of two funds, a fund's interim relative performance can be described by one variable: the difference between its own return and the return of the competing fund. Our theoretical model predicts that the fund's total risk in the second period decreases in this variable (see Proposition 1). In case of N > 2 funds, fund i's choice of risk in the second period depends on N − 1 variables: the differences between fund i's return and the returns of other funds over the first period. In Section 5, using simulations, we provided evidence that a general negative relationship between the fund relative performance in the first period and the total risk chosen in the second period holds in case of more than two funds. For the empirical analysis, the (N − 1)-dimensional information about the relative performance of a fund over the first period (Info 1 ) will be summarized by one interim relative performance measure. For the sake of robustness, we use several different specifications of this measure. All of them are non-decreasing functions of the differences between fund i's return and the returns of other funds over the first period, which is taken to be the first three quarters of the year (similarly to Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , we examine fund strategic behavior during the last quarter of the year).
Our first measure is fund i's interim category return rank defined as
where I {} is an indicator function and N is the number of funds in the fund i's category. By construction, RANK ranges from 0 for the worst interim performer to 1 for the top interim performer in the category.
The second measure we use is fund i's interim category-adjusted return:
where R cat 1 represents the median return in the fund i's category over the first nine months of the year.
Our last variable (denoted P ROB i,1 ) measures the probability of fund i finishing the year ranked first in its category (i.e., having the highest annual return in the category), conditional on its interim performance, provided that funds do not change their strategies in the second part of the year and that market conditions do not change. Since we cannot calculate the probability of fund i having the maximum two-period return analytically, we estimate this probability from simulations. The simulation procedure is based on the market model and fund-specific parameters estimated during the first nine months of the year (see Appendix C for a detailed description). Note that, by construction, P ROB lies strictly between 0 to 1 and is increasing with fund's interim performance.
In our empirical analysis, we examine whether a fund's choice of risk in the last quarter of the year is negatively related to its interim relative performance measured by the three variables defined above.
Methodology
As discussed in section 2, standard methodology used in the literature (see, e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996, and Koski and Pontiff, 1999) has not produced significant empirical evidence of strategic risk taking by fund managers, which is robust to cross-correlation effects in fund returns. Therefore, in this paper we develop a new, more powerful empirical methodology to examine changes in fund risk. A manager can influence the level of the fund's total risk in two ways: by changing the fund's factor loadings or the level of the idiosyncratic risk. Testing the model's predictions about the total risk, we should take into account that the fund's total risk may increase or decrease due to the change in market volatility even when its factor betas remain the same. Busse (2001) reports that about 90% of the change in fund standard deviation between the first six months and the last six months of the year arises from changes in the volatility of the common risk (market, size, book-to-market, and momentum) factors and only about 10% from the deliberate actions of fund managers. This will not invalidate tests based on total risk, if all funds have the same factor betas. However, in the case that funds' factor loadings differ from each other, tests based on total risk may produce biased results. There is extensive evidence in the literature (see, e.g., Brown and Goetzmann, 1997) that there are consistent differences between the risk exposures (in particular, market betas) of US diversified equity funds that compose our sample and that these differences are significant not only across, but also within categories. This suggests that changes in fund risk due to fund managers' strategic actions can be better measured by the changes in fund risk exposures.
In this paper, we focus our analysis on the within-year strategic changes in fund exposures to the market factor, which appears to be the most important determinant of fund total risk. Since systematic risk constitutes about 80% of the fund's total risk (see Table 1), an increase in the fund's market beta typically results in an increase in the fund's total risk. Due to limitations of our data (fund monthly returns), we do not investigate strategic changes in fund unsystematic risk here. Similarly to tests of the total risk, tests of the unsystematic risk should account for the differences in fund loadings with respect to other factors (e.g., size and momentum) to produce unbiased results. Thus, we investigate whether a fund's systematic risk in the last quarter of the year is related to its relative performance over the first three quarters of the year.
Assume that fund returns over period t (t = 1 and t = 2 correspond to the first nine months and the last three months of the year, respectively) are generated from a one-factor model with the market factor:
where E(ε i,t ) = 0 and E(ε i,t ε i,s ) = 0 (t 6 = s). R i,t , R m t , and R f t represent the fund i's return, the S&P500 return, and the one-month T-bill rate accumulated over period t, while α i,t and β i,t denote the Jensen's alpha and market beta of fund i in period t, respectively. According to our model, each fund i follows a consistent risk policy with constant beta β i,1 in the first period (in our setting, the first nine months of the year). In the second period (the last quarter of the year), fund i modifies its beta depending on its interim relative performance P ERF i,1 :
where P ERF is measured as RANK, RADJ, or P ROB over the first three quarters of the year. Substituting (7) to (6) for t = 2 and assuming that fund Jensen's alphas (managerial skills) do not change during the year (i.e., 1 3 α i,1 = α i,2 ), we obtain
where the residuals ε * i,2 = u i,2 (R m 2 − R f 2 ) + ε i,2 are assumed to have zero expectation and be uncorrelated over time. We also assume that u i,2 and ε i,2 are uncorrelated, i.e., fund managers do not possess a timing ability.
We estimate the model parameters in two stages. First, we estimate α i,1 and β i,1 on the basis of fund monthly returns during the first nine months of the year. This allows us to compute the market-model residuals over the last quarter of the year (the left-hand side of (8)), which would be obtained under the null hypothesis that funds do not change their systematic risk during the year. In the second stage, we estimate γ, using a panel regression approach and the Fama-MacBeth approach.
Our main results are based on the panel regression approach, which is applied to observations pooled over all years in the sample. We run a panel regression with fixed time effects, including year dummies in (8). We compute weighted least squares estimates with year-specific weights estimated on the basis of the OLS residuals (i.e., with the variance of the residuals modelled as a function of year dummies). As noted by Busse (2001) , neglecting cross-correlation in fund returns may lead to spurious inference due to the underestimated standard errors. In order to account for the cross-correlation effects, we calculate empirical p-values based on simulations under the null hypothesis of no strategic risk-taking. The simulation procedure is constructed as in Goriaev, Nijman, and Werker (2001) . For each month, we simulate the vector of fund returns from a multivariate normal distribution with a mean vector and variance matrix that are estimated from the observed monthly fund returns in a given year. Repeating this process 1000 times, we obtain empirical p-values. 4 In addition, we estimate the model (8) in each of the nineteen annual tournaments from 1980 to 1998. The corresponding p-values are calculated using the same simulation procedure as before, accounting for the cross-correlation in fund returns. Based on the time series of nineteen values of γ corresponding to the annual tournaments, we also calculate the overall Fama-MacBeth estimates of γ. Table 3 presents the results based on model (8). Panel A reports the γ coefficients and the corresponding simulated p-values, based on the panel regression approach. The coefficients on all three relative performance measures are negative, being highly significant for RADJ and P ROB (p-values are below 1%), and marginally significant for RANK (the p-value is below 10%). The results are significant not only statistically, but also economically. A 40% move (e.g., a move from 20th to 60th return percentile) in category rankings or a 9% change in fund category-adjusted return over the first three quarters of the year are associated with a subsequent change in beta in the last quarter of the year of about 0.1. The same change in beta is also caused by 14% change in P ROB.
Results
Similar results are obtained using the Fama-MacBeth approach (see Table 3 , Panel B). The coefficients have approximately the same magnitude as those based on the panel approach and are all highly significant. These results demonstrate that systematic risk chosen by fund managers in the last quarter of the year is negatively related to fund interim relative performance, which is consistent with Proposition 1.
To illustrate the findings in more details, Table 4 presents the results of each of the annual tournaments from 1980 to 1998. The pattern of the negative relationship between fund interim performance and subsequent changes in systematic risk is consistent across years. For example, only in three out of nineteen years, the coefficient on RADJ is positive. Most of the significant annual coefficients are also negative. For instance, only one from six coefficients on P ROB that are significant at 5% level is positive.
One may expect that strategic behavior is more pronounced among small and young funds, for which it should be easier to change the riskiness of the portfolios. We estimated our model including the interaction terms of fund interim performance and size as well as age in (7). However, we did not find any significant differences in systematic risk policy during the last quarter of the year between small and large funds as well as young and old funds.
We also estimated the model (8) separately for October, November, and December, examining whether fund beta in a given month is related to its year-to-date performance. For each of the three months, the relationship between fund interim performance and subsequent change in market beta is negative, being the strongest in statistical terms for October. A statistically weaker results for November and December may be explained by the window-dressing effects documented in, e.g., Carhart et al. (2002) .
In addition, we estimated the model (8) measuring fund performance relative to an asset class of all diversified equity funds rather than to funds with the same stated objective. Fund managers may be interested in maximizing their asset class relative performance, since it appears to have as strong impact on fund flows as relative performance with respect to the stated objective category (see Goriaev, 2002) . We found a similar negative relationship between fund interim performance relative to diversified equity funds and systematic risk in the last quarter of the year. However, this relationship was somewhat weaker in statistical terms than for fund performance relative to the stated objective category.
Conclusion
The nature of the competition in the money management industry generates relative performance objectives for mutual fund managers. In this paper, we study how ranking objectives (as in a tournament) influence portfolio decision of a fund manager. In a two-period setting, we show how interim ranking influences the riskiness of the investment strategy chosen by managers in both periods. In the first period, managers choose the same risk level but do not maximize their expected return. In the second period, the interim loser increases risk, while the interim winner decreases risk relative to the first period. Furthermore, the level of risk undertaken by the interim loser is increasing with the difference in interim performances. Using simulations, we also demonstrate that the negative relationship between interim performance and risk chosen in the second period holds in the case with more than two competing funds.
Then, we provide empirical evidence that fund managers' risk-taking behavior is consistent with ranking objectives. Specifically, we find that fund systematic risk in the last quarter of the year is negatively related to the interim category-relative performance, which is consistent with our theoretical predictions. Our statistical tests take into account the presence of the cross-correlation in fund returns, which was not the case in the previous empirical studies of fund risk taking behavior (see, e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996, and Koski and Pontiff, 1999) and could lead to spurios inference (see Busse, 2001 ).
Finally, our results suggest that investors may be better off taking into account not only performance rankings, but also the difference in performances when selecting between funds. Such allocation rule would "linearize" managers' incentives and mitigate the adverse incentives of fund managers.
Appendix A: Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1: An equilibrium in pure strategies in the period 2 subgame is a pair (v * l , v * w ) such that
and
The system of first-order conditions is equivalent to
Conditions (11) and (12) imply that
From conditions (11) and (12), we deduce that
This implies that
In turn, this implies that dv l and dv w are of opposite signs. Furthermore, from (13), (14) and (16), we obtain that
Given the assumption that m 000 (·) > 0 and the result that v * l > v * w in equilibrium, it follows that m 00 (v * w )/m 00 (v * l ) < 1. Hence, v * w and v * l are decreasing and increasing in δ, respectively.. 2 Proof of Proposition 2: Let δ ij = r i,1 − r j,1 (i, j = 1, 2, i 6 = j). From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that a manager who is leading after the first period has a probability strictly larger than 1/2 of winning the contest. Now, if manager 1 chooses v 1 =v in the first period, then for any v 2 6 =v chosen by manager 2, Prob(δ 2,1 > 0) < 1/2, while if manager 2 chooses v 2 6 =v in the first period, then Prob(δ 2,1 > 0) = 1/2. Hence,v is a best reply tô v.. 2
Appendix B: Correlated returns
In this appendix, we analyze the case in which managers choose among portfolios with correlated returns. To do so, we modify the model of Section 3 in the following way. Assume that a safe asset (S) with return normalized to 1, and two risky portfolios are available. These two portfolios (hereafter, p a and p b ) have returns (R a and R b ) independently and normally distributed with variances v a =v and v b >v and means m a = m(v a ) and m b = m(v b ) (with m a > 1 and m b > 1), respectively; the function m(·) andv being as defined in Section 3. Therefore, m b < m a . Denote l the interim loser and w the interim winner. In the second period, manager j (j = l, w) chooses an allocation (θ aj , θ bj ), θ aj and θ bj being invested in portfolio p a and p b , respectively, and (1 − θ aj − θ bj ) being invested in asset S. It follows that the return of manager j in the second period is
For tractability, we restrict the set of choices to θ aj ≥ 0, θ bj ≥ 0 and θ aj + θ bj < 1. This implies that shortselling the safe asset or the two risky portfolios is forbidden.
The main difference with Section 3 is that now returns are correlated, and their covariance is endogenous:
Let R 1w /R 1,l = ∆. 5 It is straightforward that the best reply of the interim winner is to choose the same allocation as the loser since in such a case, he wins the contest with probability 1. Conversely, the objective of the interim loser is to choose an allocation that generates a return correlated as little as possible with the return of the interim winner. It follows that such a game has only equilibria in mixed strategies. For some of these equilibria, we can derive results about the relative amount of risk undertaken by the two managers.
Proposition 3 Assume that A = 0 and consider any equilibrium such that (i) managers only invest in the risky portfolios (i.e., θ aj + θ bj = 1, j = l, w) and (ii) managers randomize between the two same allocations (θ aj , θ bj ) = (θ 0 , 1 − θ 0 ) or (θ aj , θ bj ) = (θ 00 , 1 − θ 00 ) (j = l, w) with θ 0 > θ 00 . Denote q j the equilibrium probability that manager j chooses θ aj = θ 0 . Then, in such an equilibrium, the interim loser takes, on average, more risk than the interim winner: the interim loser chooses θ 0 with a lower probability than the interim winner, i.e., q l < q w .
Proof: Consider any equilibrium that satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). Given the equilibrium strategy of the interim loser (i.e., the probability q l with which he chooses θ 0 ), the interim winner is indifferent between the two pure strategies. This implies that
it follows that
.
Proceeding similarly, we find that
Let r 2,i = log(R 2,i ) (i = l, w) and δ = log(∆). Then, q w > q l is equivalent to
This is equivalent to
where Φ is cdf of the standard normal distribution. Given that θ 0 > θ 00 , this last inequality always holds. 2
If managers do not buy the risk-free bond, then the larger θ bj , the larger the amount of risk taken by manager j. Proposition 3 states that in any equilibrium such that managers do not buy the risk-free bond and choose among the same two allocations, the interim loser takes more risk than the interim winner, on average.
This result is different from Taylor (2000) for one main reason. Taylor considers an economy with a risk-free asset and one risky asset. It follows that an interim winner increasing risk also increases the expected return of his portfolio. He does not face a tradeoff between increasing the variance and decreasing the expected return. Conversely, we consider a situation such that managers have the possibility to choose portfolios with low expected return and high variance .
We can derive further results on the interim loser's risk taking incentives.
Proposition 4 Assume that A = 0 and the interim winner chooses a portfolio such that θ aw + θ bw = 1 (i.e., does not buy the risk-free bond). If θ aw ≤ 1/2, then the best reply of the interim loser is θ al = 1. If θ aw > 1/2, then the best reply of the interim loser is θ bl = 1.
Proof: Proceeding as in the previous section, one shows that the objective of interim loser is to maximize
with respect to θ al and θ bl under the constraint that θ al + θ bl ≤ 1. First, we show that there cannot be an interior solution to this problem. To see this, assume that the interim loser chooses θ bl ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, if θ bl < θ bw , for any θ al , ∂H/∂θ al > 0. It implies that the interim loser chooses θ al = 1 − θ bl . Now if θ bl > θ bw , then it implies that θ al < θ aw (since, by assumption, θ aw + θ bw = 1).
If θ al < θ aw , then for any α al , ∂H/∂θ bl > 0. It implies that the interim loser chooses θ bl = 1 − θ al . Therefore, we always have θ aw + θ al = 1. This implies that the problem of the interim loser is to choose θ al to maximize
under the constraint that θ al ∈ [0, 1]. It is straightforward that this is equivalent to maximizing |θ al − θ aw |. Therefore, if θ aw < 1/2, the interim loser chooses θ al = 1, while if θ aw > 1/2, the interim loser chooses θ bl = 1. 2
This proposition tells us that the best reply of the interim loser to an allocation of only risky portfolios by the interim winner is to choose the allocation of only risky portfolios that minimizes the correlation with the return of the interim winner.
From Propositions 3 and 4, we derive the following result.
Proposition 5 Assume that A = 0. There exists an equilibrium such that (i) the interim winner chooses θ aw = 1 with probability q w and θ bw = 1 with probability (1 − q w ) (ii) the interim loser chooses θ al = 1 with probability q l and θ bl = 1 with probability (1 − q l ) (iii) q w > q l .
Proof: As already mentioned, the best reply of the interim winner is to play the same strategy as the interim loser. Furthermore, from Proposition 4, we know that (θ al , θ bl ) = (1, 0) is a best reply to (θ aw , θ bw ) with θ aw > 1/2 and θ aw + θ bw = 1; and that (θ al , θ bl ) = (0, 1) is a best reply to (θ aw , θ bw ) with θ aw < 1/2 and θ aw + θ bw = 1. This implies that there exists an equilibrium in which manager j chooses (θ aj , θ bj ) = (1, 0) with probability q j and (θ aj , θ bj ) = (0, 1) with probability 1 − q j (j = w, l). Proposition 3 implies that q w > q l . 2
This proposition states that there exist equilibria such that Proposition 3 holds: when both the variance and the covariance of the portfolios are strategic variables, then, on average, the interim loser takes more risk than the interim winner. Hence, the results derived in Section 4 still hold (qualitatively) when returns are correlated and their covariance level is a strategic variable.
Appendix C: Simulation procedure for the third relative performance measure
The third interim relative performance measure used in this paper, P ROB i,1 , is the estimate of the probability that fund i has the highest annual return in its category, conditional on fund performance over the first three quarters of the year and given that funds do not change their strategies and that market conditions do not change in the last quarter of the year. This appendix describes the simulation procedure used to compute this measure.
We use a market model (6) as a basis for our simulations. We simulate fund last-quarter returns using the distribution parameters estimated on the basis of fund monthly returns during the first three quarters of the year. Specifically, we estimate fund Jensen's alphas and market betas, the mean and variance of the excess market return, and the variance matrix of the market-model residuals (in order to preserve the cross-correlation structure of fund returns). The vector of simulated fund returns over the last quarter of the year is then calculated as a function of fund Jensen's alphas and betas as well as randomly generated values of the excess market return and the market-model residuals.
Formally, for each category consisting of N funds, we simulate the N × 1 vector of fund returns over the last quarter of the year using the following formula:
where α 1 and β 1 denote the N × 1 vectors of Jensen's alphas and market betas of funds estimated over the first three quarters of the year, respectively. The excess market return RMRF 1 is generated from a normal distribution with mean and variance calculated on the basis of monthly excess market returns in the first nine months of the year. The vector of residuals e 1 is generated from a normal distribution with zero mean and variance matrix estimated on the basis of monthly market-model residuals in the first three quarters of the year. Note that the excess market returns, Jensen's alphas and market-model residuals are calculated on the three-quarter basis and should be divided by three to obtain a quarterly return in (19). The simulated probability of becoming a top fund in the category is based on 1000 replications of this procedure.
Table 1 Summary statistics of US diversified equity funds
The table presents summary statistics of the US diversified equity funds calculated for the whole sample and for the aggressive growth, growth, growth-and-income, equity-income, and small company categories. Jensen's alpha, beta, and unsystematic risk are calculated on the basis of the one-factor model with the market factor. Total risk and unsystematic risk are measured as the standard deviation of the returns and the return residuals in the market model, respectively. Mean and standard deviation of fund return, total risk, Jensen's alpha, beta, and unsystematic risk (all annualized) are calculated over the sample period January 1980 -December 1998. Mean and standard deviation of fund size and age are calculated on the basis of cross-sectional data as of beginning of 1999. The table presents interim category return rankings (after the first nine months of the year) of funds with the highest annual returns within a given objective category (aggressive growth, growth, growth-and-income, equity-income, or small company) in each year from 1980 to 1998. The number of funds in a given category and in a given year is in the parentheses. 
